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Abstract—Whereas maintenance has been recognized as an
important and effective means for risk management in power
systems, it turns out to be intractable if cascading blackout risk
is considered due to the extremely high computational complexity.
In this paper, based on the inference from the blackout simulation
data, we propose a methodology to efficiently identify the most
influential component(s) for mitigating cascading blackout risk in
a large power system. To this end, we first establish an analytic
relationship between maintenance strategies and blackout risk
estimation by inferring from the data of cascading outage simu-
lations. Then we formulate the component maintenance decision-
making problem as a nonlinear 0-1 programming. Afterwards,
we quantify the credibility of blackout risk estimation, leading
to an adaptive method to determine the least required number
of simulations, which servers as a crucial parameter of the
optimization model. Finally, we devise two heuristic algorithms
to find approximate optimal solutions to the model with very
high efficiency. Numerical experiments well manifest the efficacy
and high efficiency of our methodology.
Index Terms—Cascading failure; blackout risk; component
maintenance; data inference
I. INTRODUCTION
UNDER certain conditions, system disturbances or com-ponent outages in a power system can initiate a sequence
of component failures, i.e., cascading outages, leading to se-
rious consequence, even catastrophic blackouts. Although the
probability of such catastrophic blackouts is tiny, theoretical
research and practical experience have revealed that such
blackout risk cannot be ignored [1]–[4].
Intuitively, maintaining component is seen as an effective
means to mitigate cascading blackout risk since it directly
reduces the probability of component failures [5], [6]. In prac-
tice, whereas there are usually a huge number of components
in a power system, a few of them have much larger influ-
ence on the blackout risk than the others [7]–[9]. Therefore,
choosing those most influential components for maintenance
can greatly facilitate effective mitigation of blackout risk
with limited resource. This idea is not new, which has been
extensively deployed in conventional reliability-centered main-
tenance (RCM) or risk-based maintenance (RBM). In [10],
a risk-based resource optimization model for transmission
system maintenance is proposed, where both maintenance
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strategies and corresponding risk reductions serve as input
data. From a different perspective, risk could be defined and
calculated via scenario enumeration. And those components
associated with high-risk scenarios are selected for mainte-
nance in [11]. More rigorously, [12] employs a 0-1 integer
programming to optimize system risk with resource limitation
in power systems, where the system risk is defined as the sum
of component risks and is calculated by enumeration. A similar
optimization model is presented in [6]. In all these methods,
maintenance strategies are selected based on risk evaluation
with respect to the considered maintenance strategies.
The aforementioned methods have been demonstrated to
work well in both RCM and RBM. Unfortunately, when the
cascading blackout is considered, it is not the case. The
main reason relies on the matter of fact that it is extremely
computational complex to evaluate cascading blackout risk
with respect to maintenance strategies. As well known, the
propagation of a cascading outage is a complicated dynamic
process involving various random factors, making it impos-
sible to evaluate blackout risk analytically. Hence Monte
Carlo (MC) method is often employed to estimate cascading
blackout risk as a surrogate. To achieve a credible estimation,
however, MC method needs to generate a large number of
samples via cascading blackout simulations [13]–[15], which
is extremely time consuming [16]. If a large number of
components are taken into account, MC method may fail due
to the notorious “curse of dimensionality”. When maintenance
is considered, the problem turns out to be much worse. Since
there is lack of analytic relationship to bridge the estimated
blackout risks with component failure probabilities that vary
with maintenance strategies, samples used to estimate the
blackout risk with respect to a specific maintenance strat-
egy cannot be used for another. That implies, whenever the
maintenance strategy changes, all blackout samples have to be
completely regenerated by conducting blackout simulations.
Considering the huge number of components and possible
maintenance strategies, both sample generation and blackout
risk estimation are extremely time-consuming, making the
corresponding maintenance optimization problem intractable.
Regarding to this obstacle, [17] exploits the underlying
information of cascading blackouts hidden in the data of
cascading blackout simulations, leading to a semi-analytic
method to characterize the relationship between (unbiased)
blackout risk estimation and component failure probabilities. It
opens up the possibility to directly estimate blackout risk under
varying component failure probabilities, with no need of re-
generating any samples. That essentially motivates an efficient
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risk evaluation approach to cope with varying maintenance
strategies. In this paper, we extend the work to address the op-
timal component maintenance problem considering cascading
blackout risk. Major contributions of our work are threefold:
1) Inferring from cascading blackout simulation data, an
analytic relationship between estimated blackout risk
and maintenance strategy is established. Based on it, we
formulate the optimal component maintenance problem
as a nonlinear 0-1 programming. Particularly, the evalu-
ation of cascading blackout risk with respect to varying
maintenance strategies, at the first time, is explicitly
expressed based on simulation data in the model.
2) In order to guarantee the credibility of the blackout
risk evaluation when solving the proposed optimization
model, we propose an adaptive method to determine an
appropriate sample size via credibility analyses based on
the inference from simulation data.
3) The proposed optimization model is a high-dimensional
nonlinear 0-1 programming, which is NP-hard with a
complicated objective function. To solve this nontrivial
optimization problem, we propose two simple heuristic
algorithms to search nearly-optimal solutions to the
problem with very high efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives basic definitions and notations, based on which the op-
timization problem is formulated. In Section III, according to
the credibility analyses of blackout risk estimation, the critical
parameter, sample size, is determined. Two high-efficiency
heuristic algorithms and the holistic procedure are presented
in Section IV. In Section V, case studies are presented. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper with remarks.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FORMULATIONS
In this work, we aim at mitigating cascading blackout risk
via maintaining a few components in the system. Basically, the
influence of maintenance on component failure probabilities
can be estimated based on the historical data and experience.
Therefore, the critical issue is how to characterize the rela-
tionship between component failure probabilities and blackout
risk (or more precisely, the estimation of blackout risk). As
long as the relationship is obtained, it is straightforward to
decide maintenance strategies by enumeration or optimization.
Obviously, an analytic relationship is preferable for mainte-
nance strategy optimization. In this context, we employ the
method given in [17] to further analytically characterize the
relationship between estimated blackout risk and maintenance
strategies through the inference from blackout simulation data,
and formulate the optimization problem explicitly.
A. Definitions
We start with the basic definitions of cascading outages,
component failure probability function as well as blackout risk.
In light of [16], an n-stage cascading outage can be defined
as a Markov sequence denoted by
Z := {X0, X1, ..., Xj , ..., Xn, Xj ∈ X , ∀j ∈ N}
with respect to a probability series, g(Z). Here, N :=
{1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of cascading stages; j is the stage
label; Xj is the state variables of the system at stage j, which
can be ON/OFF statues of components, power injections at
each bus, etc. Particularly, X0 is the initial system state of the
cascading outage, which is assumed to be deterministic. The
state space X is assumed to be finite. Regarding a specific
cascading outage, z = {x0, ..., xj , ..., xn}. And its probability
(series) is denoted by g(z) := g(x0, ..., xj , ..., xn). At stage j,
the failure probability of component k is denoted by
ϕk(xj) := Pr(component k fails at xj ) (1)
where ϕk is referred to as component failure probability
function. It is determined by inherent characteristics of the
component, e.g., component type, operating condition, etc. If
a certain component k is maintained, the failure probability
function will change accordingly. We denote the failure prob-
ability function of component k after maintenance by ϕ¯k.
Noting that load shedding can be involved in a cascading
outage, we use a general definition of cascading blackout risk
associated with load shedding [16]. Specifically, denote Y as
the load shedding of a cascading outage. It is a random variable
and can be further regarded as a function of the corresponding
cascading outage, i.e., Y = h(Z). Then the blackout risk with
respect to g(Z) and a given load shedding level Y0 is
Rg(Y0) := E(Y · δ{Y≥Y0}) =
∑
z∈Z
g(z)h(z)δ{h(z)≥Y0} (2)
where Z is the set of all possible cascading outages; δ{Y≥Y0}
an indicator function of the events {Y ≥ Y0}, given by
δ{Y≥Y0} :=
{
1 if Y ≥ Y0;
0 otherwise.
The cascading blackout risk defined in Eq. (2) is indeed the
expectation of load shedding beyond the given level, Y0. When
Y0 = 0, it is the traditional definition of blackout risk. When
Y0 > 0, it is the risk of those events with serious consequences,
specifically, with a load shedding greater than Y0.
B. Analytic Relationship Inference from Simulation Data
Invoking the Markov property and conditional probability
formula, g(z) can be rewritten as
g(z) = g(xn, · · · , x1, x0) =
n−1∏
j=0
gj+1(xj+1|xj) (3)
where gj+1(xj+1|xj) represents the transition probability from
state xj to state xj+1. Considering the failure components at
stage j, (3) is equivalent to
g(z) =
n−1∏
j=0

 ∏
k∈Fj
ϕk(xj) ·
∏
k∈F¯j
(1 − ϕk(xj))

 (4)
where Fj is the component set consisting of the components
that are defective at xj+1 but work normally at xj , while F¯j
consists of components that work normally at xj+1.
Since maintenance only influences some components in the
system, we consider the items related to a specific component
k ∈ K in (4) and define
Γ(ϕk, z) :=


n−1∏
j=0
(1− ϕk(xj)) : if nk = n
ϕk(xnk)
nk−1∏
j=0
(1− ϕk(xj)) : otherwise
(5)
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where K is the set including all components; nk is the stage
at which component k fails. Particularly, if component k does
not fail in the whole cascading process, let nk := n. Then
g(z) =
∏
k∈K
Γ(ϕk, z) (6)
Substituting (6) into (2) yields
Rg(Y0) =
∑
z∈Z
(
h(z)δ{h(z)≥Y0} ·
∏
k∈K
Γ(ϕk, z)
)
(7)
Eq.(7) reveals the inherent relationship between Rg(Y0)
and ϕk. However, since |Z| and |K| 1 may be very large,
it cannot be directly used in optimization. Alternatively, we
use an approximation of Rg(Y0) in terms of a set of samples,
which is given by
Rˆg(Y0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} (8)
In (8), N is the number of independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) samples which are generated using specific blackout
simulation models with respect to g(Z) (or more precisely,
ϕk, k ∈ K); zi = {xi0, ..., xij , ..., xini} is the i-th sample,
where ni is the number of stages in i-th sample. Particularly,
we define Zg := {zi, i = 1, · · · , N},which stands for the
sample set generated with respect to g(Z).
When some ϕk change due to maintenance, g(Z) will be
converted into another probability series. We denote the new
probability series after maintenance by f(Z). Regarding Zg,
[17] says that the unbiased estimation of Rf (Y0) is given by
Rˆf (Y0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
w(zi)h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} (9)
where w(zi) is the sample weight of zi and is defined as
w(zi) :=
f(zi)
g(zi)
, (∀zi ∈ Z) (10)
According to (9), it is interesting that Rˆf (Y0) only requires
the information of zi which is generated in the blackout
simulations with respect to g(Z). It implies that, when g(Z)
changes to f(Z), the blackout risk can be directly obtained
using the information of Zg, other than regenerating samples
via blackout simulations. Therefore, it enables a way to
explicitly express the blackout risk with respect to maintenance
strategies, which will greatly facilitate the formulation of
optimal maintenance decision-making problem, as we explain.
C. Formulation of Maintenance Strategy Optimization
We use a binary variable mk to represent the maintenance
status of component k. If component k is maintained,mk = 1;
otherwise,mk = 0. Then we use a vectorM := {mk, k ∈ K}
to represent the maintenance strategy. For a specific sample zi,
we have
f(zi) =
∏
k∈K
[
mkΓ(ϕ¯k, z
i) + (1−mk)Γ(ϕk, zi)
]
(11)
1| · | is the operator stands for the cardinality of a set.
Substituting (11) into (9) yields
Rˆf (Y0)
= 1
N
N∑
i=1
∏
k∈K
[mkΓ(ϕ¯k,zi)+(1−mk)Γ(ϕk,zi)]
∏
k∈K
Γ(ϕk,zi)
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0}
= 1
N
N∑
i=1
[( ∏
k∈K∗
1 +mk
(
Γ(ϕ¯k,z
i)
Γ(ϕk,zi)
− 1
))
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0}
]
(12)
where K∗ is the set including all the components which are
available for maintenance. Obviously, K∗ ⊆ K and mk =
0, ∀k /∈ K∗.
Eq.(12) reveals the relationship between estimated black-
out risk and maintenance strategies. Moreover, it essentially
provides the estimation of cascading blackout risk with an
explicit expression. To minimize the blackout risk with a
limited number of components considered in maintenance, an
optimization problem is formulated as
min
mk
1
N
N∑
i=1
[( ∏
k∈K∗
1 +mk
(
Γ(ϕ¯k,z
i)
Γ(ϕk,zi)
− 1
))
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0}
]
s.t.
∑
k∈K∗
mk ≤Mmax
(13)
where mk, k ∈ K∗ are the decision variables. Mmax is a
predefined parameter that stands for the maximum number of
components considered in maintenance. Γ(ϕ, zi), Γ(ϕ¯k, z
i),
h(zi) and δ{h(zi)≥Y0} are variables rely on samples. For
simplicity, we define an N -dimension vector C and two
|K∗| ×N matrices, P and Q, which are defined by
Ci := h(z
i)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} ∀i
Pki := Γ(ϕk, z
i) ∀i, k
Qki := Γ(ϕ¯k, z
i) ∀i, k
The optimization model (13) is a high-dimensional 0-1
programming. To solve this nontrivial optimization problem,
the following two issues should be well addressed.
1) Determining appropriate sample size, N : In the opti-
mization model (13), the sample size, i.e., N , is a crucial
parameter, since the objective function is an unbiased esti-
mation of blackout risk and the estimation error relies on
N . To guarantee the credibility of the estimation, a large
enough N is necessary. On the other hand, a too large N will
remarkably increase the computational burden. Unfortunately,
it is not trivial to determine an appropriate sample size. In this
regard, we analyze the variance of blackout risk estimation
based on the inference from simulation data, leading to an
adaptive method to find a suitable sample size that achieves a
good trade-off between estimation accuracy and computation
complexity. Details will be given in Sections III and IV-B.
2) Reducing computational complexity: Even if an ap-
propriate sample size N has been determined, solving the
optimization problem (13) still faces with great challenge.
Note that the number of decision variables in (13), which
equals |K∗|, could be very large. Moreover, there are 2|K∗|−1
product terms of decision variables in the objective function.
Therefore, optimization problem (13) is a high-dimensional 0-
1 integer programming. It is NP-hard, where enumeration and
conventional optimization algorithms (e.g., branch and bound)
are proved powerless. In this context, we devise two simple
REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT 4
but efficient algorithms to find nearly-optimal solutions of (13)
in a heuristic manner. Details will be given in Section IV.
III. DETERMINING N BASED ON CREDIBILITY ANALYSIS
Due to the inherent uncertainty of samples in Zg, the
estimated blackout risk Rˆf (Y0) given in (9) always has
certain estimation error. Generally, increasing sample size
helps reduce estimation error. However, for determining an
appropriate sample size of Zg , i.e., N , we need to characterize
the influence ofN on the estimation error via variance analysis
based on the inference from simulation data.
A. Variance-based Credibility Analyses
We first consider the relative error bound of (9) with
respect to a specific Zg. Specifically, denote ǫ as the relative
error bound of Rˆf (Y0) with a confidence level β. Then ǫ
should make the probability of Rf (Y0) within I := [(1 −
ǫ)Rˆf (Y0), (1 + ǫ)Rˆf (Y0)] with a probability β, i.e.,
Pr
(
|Rf (Y0)− Rˆf (Y0)|
Rf (Y0)
≤ ǫ
)
= β (14)
Here 2ǫ is defined as the relative length of error bound,
which is used to quantify the credibility of blackout risk
estimation, as we explain. Note that (14) is equivalent to
Pr
(
− ǫRf (Y0)√
Df (Y0)
≤ Rf (Y0)− Rˆf (Y0)√
Df (Y0)
≤ ǫRf(Y0)√
Df (Y0)
)
= β
(15)
where Df (Y0) is the estimation variance of Rˆf (Y0) given by
(9). Invoking the Central Limit Theorem, when N is large
enough, we have
Rf (Y0)− Rˆf (Y0)√
Df (Y0)
∼ Norm(0, 1)
In this context, ǫ can be determined by solving (15), yielding
ǫ =
Φ−1(1/2− β/2)√Df (Y0)
Rf (Y0)
(16)
where Φ is the cumulative density function of the standard
normal distribution, and Φ−1 is the inverse function of Φ.
Eq. (16) says that a small enough Df(Y0) is required to
ensure the credibility of blackout risk estimation. However,
as the distribution of Rˆf (Y0) is unknown, Df (Y0) cannot
be calculated accurately in practice. To this end, we give a
proposition for estimating Df (Y0) based on a specific Zg.
Proposition 1. Given Zg, g(Z) and f(Z), an unbiased
estimation of Df(Y0) is given by
Dˆf (Y0) =
1
(N − 1)N
N∑
i=1
[
w(zi)h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} − Rˆf (Y0)
]2
(17)
Proof. We first define random variable Li(Y0) as Li(Y0) :=
f(zi)
g(zi)h(z
i)δ{h(zi)≥Y0}, i = 1, · · · , N . Since zi is i.i.d., Li(Y0)
is i.i.d. as well. Therefore, the variance of random variables
Li(Y0) are the same. Specifically, we denote the variance of
Li by df (Y0). Then we have
Df(Y0) = D
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Li(Y0)
)
=
1
N
D(Li(Y0)) =
1
N
df (Y0)
(18)
where D is an operator of variance calculation. The second
equation holds by noting Li(Y0),i = 1, · · · , N are i.i.d..
According to the definition of sample variance [19], the
unbiased estimation of df (Y0) based on Zg is given by
dˆf (Y0) =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
[
w(zi)h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} − Rˆf (Y0)
]2
(19)
Therefore, substituting (19) into (18), the unbiased estimation
of Df (Y0) can be given by (17).
Combining Eqs. (9), (16) and (17), ǫ can be estimated by
ǫˆ =
Φ−1(1/2− β/2)
√
Dˆf(Y0)
Rˆf (Y0)
(20)
And [(1 − ǫˆ)Rˆf (Y0), (1 + ǫˆ)Rˆf (Y0)] can be used as a data-
based approximate error bound of Rˆf (Y0).
On the other hand, according to Eqs. (16) and (18), we have
ǫ ∝
√
df (Y0)√
NRf (Y0)
(21)
Since df (Y0) is deterministic for specific Zg and f(Z),
when the error bound of blackout risk estimation in (6) cannot
satisfy the predefined requirement, the sample size N should
be enlarged and Zg should be updated, as we explain next.
B. Determining the Sample Size N
In this subsection, we utilize the previous credibility anal-
yses to determine an appropriate N based on the inference
from simulation data in Zg. Basically, if the estimation error
bound is determined (according to the requirement of practical
utilization), say, ǫ¯ = 10%, then (20) gives
D¯f (Y0) =
(
ǫ¯Rˆf (Y0)
Φ−1(1/2− β/2)
)2
(22)
In Eq. (22), D¯f (Y0) stands for the maximal estimation vari-
ance to make the relative error within a given error bound ǫ¯
with a confidence level of β.
To ensure that Df (Y0) is less D¯f(Y0), the required sample
size N¯ can be obtained by using (18) and (19), leading to
N¯ =
dˆf (Y0)
D¯f (Y0)
=
dˆf (Y0)
Rˆ2f (Y0)
(
Φ−1(1/2− β/2)
ǫ¯
)2
(23)
Eq. (23) indicates that, when N ≤ N¯ , the sample size is
not large enough to guarantee the credibility of blackout
risk estimation and more samples are needed to reduce the
estimation variance. It provides the optimization problem (13)
with a systematic method to determine an appropriate sample
size. The corresponding algorithm can be easily implemented
in practice, which will be presented in Section IV-B.
It is worthy of nothing that both dˆf (Y0) and Rˆf (Y0) in (23)
are calculated only based on the sample set Zg . Hence N¯ is
essentially inferred from simulation data in Zg. And there is
no need to regenerate any additional samples as long as the
sample size condition N > N¯ holds.
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IV. SOLUTION ALGORITHMS
A. Heuristic Algorithms
As mentioned previously, the optimization model (13) is a
high-dimensional nonlinear 0-1 programming, and is essen-
tially an NP-hard problem. On the other hand, many nearly-
optimal solutions are still of great performance to mitigate
blackout risk in practice (which will be demonstrated in case
studies). In this regard, here we devise two heuristic algorithms
to find nearly-optimal solutions to (13) on a fixed Zg.
Since one of the big obstacles is due to the large number of
decision variables, an naive thought is to reduce the number
of component considered for maintenance, i.e., |k∗|. To this
end, we employ a sensitivity-based approach to design an
algorithm, as presented below.
Algorithm I:
• Step 1: Sensitive analysis. Construct |K∗| scenarios, in each of
which the ϕk of a single component k ∈ K changes to ϕ¯k .
Then estimate the blackout risk with (9).
• Step 2: Scenario reduction. Choose the Mk components having
larger blackout risk reductions to make up the Km. Here, Mk
is predefined according to Mmax and experience. Particularly,
Mmax < Mk = |Km| < |K
∗|.
• Step 3: Solving optimization problem. Substitute K∗ in (13) by
Km and solve (13) by enumeration.
Since (9) only needs a few algebraic calculations, the black-
out risk estimation of each scenario is very efficient. Suppose
the average calculating time of a single scenario is ts, the
total calculating time is (|K∗|+C(Mk,Mmax))ts. Noting that
the maximal number of components that are considered for
maintenance, i.e.,Mmax, is often small in practice,Mk can be
chosen as a moderate number. Then, the number of scenarios
and the computation time by enumeration is acceptable.
Nevertheless, when Mk and Mmax become lager, the sce-
nario number (|K∗| + C(Mk,Mmax)) and the computation
time will grow dramatically. In this case, we propose another
successive algorithm as shown below.
Algorithm II:
• Step 1: Initialization. Let Km = ∅. Its complementary set
denoted by K¯m equals K
∗.
• Step 2: Blackout risk estimation. Construct |K¯m| scenarios.
In each scenario, for all components in Km and a single
component in K¯m, change their ϕk to ϕ¯k and estimate the
blackout risk with (9).
• Step 3: Iteration. Choose the scenario with the lowest blackout
risk. Move corresponding component from K¯m to Km. If
|Km| = Mmax, procedure ends; otherwise, go back to Step 2.
In Algorithm II, the components need to be maintained are
determined successively. In each round, the component that
can reduce the blackout risk most effectively is selected. The
total number of scenario is (2|K∗| − Mmax + 1)Mmax/2.
Since the scenario number increases linearly with K∗, the
optimization process remains efficient even in a large system.
Initiate Data
Generate 
Samples
Solve 
Optimization 
problem
Results 
credible
Algorithm I Algorithm II
Choose Mk 
component with 
smaller risk
Enumerate all 
strategies & 
choose
Choose 1 component from 
with smallest riskmK
max| |mK M=
End
Start
Y
Y
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the methodology
B. Procedure
The procedure of the methodology (see Fig. 1) is summa-
rized as follows.
Procedure I:
• Step 1: Initialization. Initiate necessary data of the system.
Particularly, determine ϕk and ϕ¯k for each component in the
system. Moreover, the initial sample size is N = N0.
• Step 2: Sample generation. Generate N samples based on the
specific blackout model and ϕk, k ∈ K. The sample set is Zg .
Based on Zg , ϕk and ϕ¯k, calculate matrices C,P and Q.
• Step 3: Optimizing maintenance strategy. Solving the opti-
mization problem (13) by Algorithm I or II.
• Step 4: Credibility evaluation. For the optimal maintenance
strategy, calculate the necessary sample size N¯ with (23). If
N¯ ≥ N , generate another N¯ − N samples and add them into
Zg . Then go back to Step 3; Otherwise, directly choose the
optimal one according to the results in Step 3.
Procedure I incorporates an adaptive selection of sample
size based on credibility evaluation, as shown in Step 4. In this
way, the sample size can be minimized, while the estimation
error is guaranteed within a predefined limit. It is worthy
of noting that, benefiting from the inference from blackout
simulation data, all samples are generated with respect to g(Z)
only, other than different f(Z). It leads to a significant reduc-
tion of sampling time and simplification of implementation.
V. CASE STUDIES
A. Settings
In this section, the numerical experiments are carried out
on the IEEE 57-bus system and 300-bus system with a
simplified OPA model omitting the slow dynamic [13]. In
simulations, traditional MC is employed considering random
failures of both transmission lines and power transformers.
The failure probability functions of transmission lines and
power transformers are the ones in [16] and [18], respectively.
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Typical parameters are used as well. For simplicity, only the
maintenance of power transformers is considered in this work.
It is worth of noting that the simulation model with specific
component failure probability functions mentioned above is
just employed to demonstrate the proposed method. More
realistic models and settings can be adopted for coping with
more realistic situations.
B. IEEE 57-bus system
In this case, we use a small system including 53 transmis-
sion lines and 17 power transformers to demonstrate the dif-
ficulties in mitigating cascading blackout risk via component
maintenance and some salient features of the proposed method.
1) Blackout risk estimation: We first show the unbiased-
ness of (9) and its inherent estimation error caused by the
randomness of samples. To this end, we construct a series
of Zg with increasing sample size and randomly change the
ϕk of four components. Then we calculate the blackout risk
with Y0 = 200 by using (9). Meanwhile, we estimate ǫ with
respect to β = 90% by (20) and calculate the corresponding
error bounds. As a comparison, we directly regenerate samples
with respect to new ϕ¯k and estimate the blackout risk by using
(7). The results are presented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 shows that the estimation errors between calculation
and directly sampling become smaller along with the increase
of the sample size. When the sample size is large enough,
they almost the same. That indicates the effectiveness of the
blackout risk estimation given by (9). To show this more
rigorously, we calculate the relative length of the error bounds
(see Fig. 3), which becomes smaller along with the increase
of sample size as well.
However, it is worthy of noting that Fig. 3 also indicates
the estimation error always exist. More importantly, when
the sample size is small, the estimation error can be very
large. Intuitively, the optimized maintenance strategies based
on a small Zg may have a large deviation in performance of
mitigating blackout risk. Therefore, considering the calculation
efficiency and the possible estimation error, the sample size of
Zg, i.e., N , needs to be selected appropriately.
2) Influence of maintenance on blackout risk : We construct
a Zg including 100, 000 samples, based on which we consider
the simultaneous maintenance of components . Since there are
only 17 transformers in this small system, we directly enumer-
ate all the possible strategies and compare the performance of
risk reductions. We first consider the maintenance of a single
component. The blackout risks with respect to Y0 = 0 and
Y0 = 100 after maintenance are given in Tab I. Particularly, the
original blackout risks are Rˆg(0) = 6.74 and Rˆg(100) = 5.14.
TABLE I
BLACKOUT RISK AFTER COMPONENT MAINTENANCE
Compon- Blackout Reduction Compon- Blackout Reduction
ent index risk ratio(%) ent index risk ratio(%)
7 6.55 2.8 7 4.86 5.4
6 6.64 1.5 6 5.00 2.7
2 6.66 1.1 3 5.02 2.2
3 6.67 1.0 2 5.02 2.2
5 6.67 1.0 15 5.03 2.1
... ... ... ... ... ...
Mean 6.68 0.9 Mean 5.02 2.2
The results in Tab I intuitively indicate that component
maintenance is an effective way to mitigate the cascading
blackout risk. Moreover, there are a few critical components in
the system which have much greater influence on the cascading
blackout risk than the others. For example, the maintenance
of NO.7 transformer can result in 2.8% reduction of blackout
risk with respect to Y0 = 0, while the average is only 0.9%.
The result confirms the effecacy of optimizing maintenance
strategy in mitigating cascading blackout risks.
Then we consider to maintain four transformers simultane-
ously. We estimate the blackout risks with all possible main-
tenance strategies. The strategies with the largest reduction
ratios of blackout risks with respect to two Y0 are presented
in Tab II and Tab III, respectively. The results show the
complicated relationship between maintenance strategies (or
more precisely, component failure probabilities) and blackout
risk, which is one of the main difficulties. Note that the risk
reduction ratios of four components are much smaller than
the sum of the four individual ratios. Moreover, the optimal
components to be maintained (see Tab II and Tab III) are not
the simple combinations of components with smaller blackout
risks (see Tab I). It indicates the influence of component failure
probabilities on blackout risk is essentially nonlinear, which
implies that one cannot quantify the influence of multiple
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component maintenance directly based on that of individual
component maintenance.
TABLE II
OPTIMAL COMPONENT MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES (Y0 = 0)
Compon- Blackout Reduction Sum of individual
ent index risk ratio(%) reduction ratio(%)
(7,6,2,5) 6.505 3.5 6.4
(7,6,5,15) 6.506 3.5 6.2
(7,6,2,15) 6.507 3.4 6.4
(7,6,3,5) 6.509 3.4 6.3
(7,6,5,14) 6.511 3.4 6.2
... ... ... ...
Mean 6.643 1.4 3.6
TABLE III
OPTIMAL COMPONENT MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES (Y0 = 200)
Compon- Blackout Reduction Sum of individual
ent index risk ratio(%) reduction ratio(%)
(7,6,5,15) 4.819 6.2 12.3
(7,6,2,5) 4.822 6.2 12.3
(7,6,3,15) 4.823 6.1 12.4
(7,6,3,5) 4.823 6.1 12.3
(7,6,2,15) 4.823 6.1 12.4
... ... ... ...
Mean 4.991 2.9 3.6
Moreover, Tab II and Tab III show that there are many
nearly-optimal maintenance strategies whose risk reduction
ratios are very close to the optimal one, despite the result-
ing components to be maintained are not exactly the same.
Considering the possible estimation error of the blackout risk
estimation, these nearly-optimal maintenance strategies can be
deployed as well. In other words, there is no need to rigorously
solve the optimization problem (13), particularly when it is
very time consuming. Therefore, we employ two heuristic
algorithms to efficiently find (nearly-)optimal solutions in this
work.
3) Heuristic algorithms: For the sake of comparing the
two heuristic algorithms, we choose different parameters and
compare the optimal maintenance strategies obtained by them.
Due to the limit of space, here we only present two typical
cases. Specifically, |Zg| = 35000,Mmax = 4. Based on them,
we employ the Algorithm I with Mk = 8, 10 and Algorithm
II to find the optimal maintenance strategies with respect to
Rf (100) and Rf (200), respectively. The results are shown in
Tab IV and Tab V.
TABLE IV
OPTIMAL STRATEGIES WITH DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS (Y0 = 200)
Method Strategy Risk reduction Number of
(%) Scenarios
Alg. I (Mk = 8) (7,6,2,3) 2.2 70
Alg. I (Mk = 10) (7,6,2,3) 2.2 210
Alg. II (7,6,2,3) 2.2 62
Enumeration (7,6,2,3) 2.2 2380
As shown in Tab IV, both algorithms give the same mainte-
nance strategy that achieves the global optimum, while in Tab
V Algorithm I withMk = 8 and Algorithm II give sub-optimal
TABLE V
OPTIMAL STRATEGIES WITH DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS (Y0 = 100)
Method Strategy Risk reduction Number of
(%) Scenarios
Alg. I (Mk = 8) (6,2,5,14) 1.0 70
Alg. I (Mk = 10) (6,2,3,7) 1.4 210
Alg. II (6,2,5,14) 1.0 62
Enumeration (6,2,3,7) 1.4 2380
solutions . The reason relies on the inherent nonlinearity
between component failure probabilities and blackout risk,
as well as inevitable uncertainty in samples. However, it is
worthy of noting that, according to our experience, Algorithm
I with a moderate Mk and Algorithm II can find an effective
maintenance strategies in most cases, which can fulfill the
requirement of practical applications.
C. IEEE 300-bus system
In this case, the complete procedure of the proposed method
is tested using the data of IEEE 300-bus system with 304 lines
and 107 transformers. Specifically, we set ǫ = 10%, β = 95%,
Mmax = 8, Mk = 20, N0 = 5000, Y0 = 0.
1) Solving process: We first present the solving process
with Algorithm I (see Tab VI). As shown in Tab VI, we start
TABLE VI
SOLVING PROCESS WITH ALGORITHM I
Step Sample size Strategy Risk ǫˆ(%)
1 5000 (6,17,46,53,68,75,88,106) 2.272 41.9
2 85000 (10,25,29,66,68,97,100,106) 2.007 10.3
3 95000 (10,25,29,66,68,77,100,106) 2.011 9.7
with a Zg including 5,000 samples. Based on it, the optimal
maintenance strategy is obtained. However, the relative error
requirement, ǫ cannot be satisfied. Therefore, 8, 0000 samples
are added into Zg according to (23) in step 2. Then the optimal
maintenance strategy and ǫˆ are recalculated correspondingly.
Repeat this process again in step 3, the final optimal mainte-
nance strategy is determined. The reduction ratio of blackout
risk with respect to Y0 = 0 is 21.5%.
The solving process with Algorithm II is summarized in Tab
VII. In this case, the optimal strategies in each step are actually
the same as the ones of Algorithm I. Note that the components
of each strategy in Tab VII are ordered according to the deci-
sion process. Despite the results given by the two algorithms
are similar in step 2 and 3, the decision processes are different.
This observation demonstrates the complicated relationship
between component failure probabilities and blackout risk
again.
TABLE VII
SOLVING PROCESS WITH ALGORITHM II
Step Sample size Strategy Risk ǫˆ(%)
1 5000 (46,106,68,53,888,75,6,17) 2.272 41.9
2 85000 (106,25,68,66,100,29,10,97) 2.007 10.3
3 95000 (106,25,68,29,66,100,77,10) 2.011 9.7
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2) Computation time: We carry out all tests on a computer
with an Intel Xeon E5-2670 of 2.6GHz and 64GB memory.
The computation times of the two algorithms are presented in
Tab VIII and Tab IX, respectively. Note that the computation
time for sampling and calculating C,P,Q in each step depends
on the number of additional samples, while the optimizing
time depends on the number of total samples. It is observed
that the computation time for sampling is much larger than
others. In our cases, 107 minutes are required to complete
sampling. Therefore, it is extremely time consuming, if not
impossible, to directly estimate all blackout risks with all
maintenance strategies by traditional methods. Our method-
ology enables a very efficient estimation of blackout risk
under varying maintenance strategies without regenerating any
samples. In addition, the optimizing time of Algorithm II is
smaller than the one of Algorithm I as fewer maintenance
scenarios are involved. Whereas it may give sub-optimal
solutions in some case, e.g., Tab IV, it is preferable for large-
scale systems with many candidate components considered for
maintenance.
TABLE VIII
COMPUTATION TIME WITH ALGORITHM I (MIN.)
Step Sampling Calculating C, P,Q Optimizing Total
1 5.35 0.37 0.08 5.80
2 90.95 5.92 0.27 97.14
3 10.70 0.74 0.31 11.75
Sum 107.00 0.42 0.66 114.69
TABLE IX
COMPUTATION TIME WITH ALGORITHM II (MIN.)
Step Sampling Calculating C, P,Q Optimizing Total
1 5.35 0.37 ≪ 0.01 5.72
2 90.95 5.92 ≪ 0.01 96.87
3 10.70 0.74 ≪ 0.01 11.44
Sum 107.00 7.03 ≪ 0.01 114.03
VI. CONCLUSION WITH REMARKS
In this paper, we have devised an efficient methodology to
optimize component maintenance strategies for effectively mit-
igating cascading blackout risk, where an analytic relationship
between blackout risk estimation and maintenance strategies
is revealed throught inference form blackout simulation data.
Theoretical analyses and numerical experiments manifest that:
1) Some components in the power systems have great influ-
ence on the propagation of cascading outages. Reducing
their failure probabilities by component maintenance can
significantly mitigate the cascading blackout risk.
2) The variance-based analyses further evaluate the credi-
bility of the risk estimation considering different main-
tenance strategies. Based on that, the proposed heuristic
algorithms can efficiently optimize the component main-
tenance strategies.
From the case studies, it is found that the most time-
consuming step is the generation of sample set. In this paper,
we simply consider a conventional MC method, which is not
efficient in large-scale systems. In future work, we hope to
introduce some recently developed high-efficiency sampling
method, such as Sequential Importance Sampling [16], SPLIT-
TING [20] , to further improve the scalability and efficiency of
the methodology. Another ongoing work is to include a more
practical formulation of maintenance strategy optimization and
corresponding solving algorithms.
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